

14 June 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 14 June 1951

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12202

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, acting for Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy
Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. George G. Carey, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Jack Smith, Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Department of the Army
Colonel B. B. Talley, Department of the Army
Lieut. Colonel John P. Merrill, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Frederick P. Munson, The Joint Staff

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

*Present for part of meeting only.

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-M-33

14 June 1951

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IAC-M-33
14 June 1951

Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meetings of 17 May 1951 (IAC-M-31) and 18 May 1951 (IAC-M-32) were approved.

Probable Soviet Reaction to the
Inclusion of Greece and Turkey in
Western Defense Agreements (SE-7)

2. Action: This estimate was approved subject to the redrafting of paragraph 4 by CIA.



3. Action: It was agreed that the material on hand did not now warrant a formal estimate on this subject. Mr. Reber was directed to bring the matter to the attention of the collection offices in order to get more information on the points raised in General Bolling's memorandum.

Proposed Estimate on Soviet
Tactics in a Prospective CFM
(NIE-28)

4. Action: It was agreed to cancel this estimate.

Proposed Estimate on Psychological
Impact of a Strategic Air Offensive
Against the USSR (NIE-39)

5. Action: It was agreed to leave the decision to General Smith as to whether an estimate could be prepared without the need for operational information from U. S. war plans.

6. Discussion: It was suggested that research could well be done on such problems as the advisability of bombing the Kremlin but that an intelligence estimate should not attempt to assess the results of such a bombing. It might, nevertheless, be possible to approach the problem backwards and estimate the kind of attack which would be required in order to develop a certain psychological effect.



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
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IAC-M-33

14 June 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-M-33
14 June 1951

Progress Report (IAC-PR-14)

8. The priority for NIE 39 "Psychological Impact of a Strategic Air Offensive Against the USSR" was changed to "Urgent." It was pointed out that it would be helpful to indicate where the suggestion for each estimate had originated.



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IAC-M-33
14 June 1951